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Jil'KiSDllJiON

Pursuant to section 78-2a-3(i) of the Utah Code., this Court has jurisdiction of this case
which is an appeal of a domestic 1 el;o<«? ? • . i •

•-

1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
i.

/-\fc tiic u i a i t

•

':< ''•'*" •<>*
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i

\,--. .

.

.

.u-r

evidence before it clearly erroneous am: u UL ir ihai ihe\ an unsupported K evidence in the
;

•'

i

:

. ;,. ..ai.« a. assets of the

Parties '
n a i i d a i u Vi

KCMCW:

(a) M[T]he findings must embody sufficient detail and include jnougii ..ui i...ai to clearly show the evidence upon which they are grounded. Woodward v. Fazzio, 8^J i'iuT/-r,
477 (Utah App. 1991);
(b) "[W]e reverse a trial court's finding of fact only if, after marshaling all relevant
e vidence from the record, the appellant demonstrates that the finding was clearly erroneous, Fife
v Fife, 111 P.2d 512 (Utah App," 1989);
jUT standard of review in divorce proceedings allows us to disturb the action of
the trial court onh \vhen the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or the trial court has
abused its discretion '••» misapplied principles of law, Wiese v Wiese, (Utah 1985);
. -

*..;,,

.;u .nuiiiui v'Maie demonstrate a clear and prejudicial

abuse of discretion?
Standard of Review: "Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony
and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated, Howell v Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App.
1991).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

There are no determinative provisions <li.il i
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

,

Clyde Kay Cummings and Oletta Cummings were married for approximately 40 years.
Mrs. Cummings initiated these divorce proceedings in August 1992. A Decree of Divorce was
entered April 7, 1995 an Appeal was taken before this Court Case No. 950504. In decision
rendered December 19,1996 this Court remanded the case to the trial court for further findings.
The trial court determined to hold a trial on the issues remanded. Following trial the Court entered
its Amended Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon remand, May 27, 1998.
The principal focus of this case is the division of marital assets, including the business land
and building. The division of assets between the parties was changed significantly by the trial
court on remand. The trial court amended its previous findings. Instead of awarding all of the
business building and land to plaintiff, the trial court awarded 75% of the building and land value
to Mrs. Cummings and awarded 25% of the building and land value to Mr. Cummings. The trial
court's division of marital assets was specifically expressed and intended to achieve a 50/50
division of the marital estate. However, the court's division of property did not achieve its
expressed purpose. The Court without any findings, facts, reasoning or explanation as to why the
trial court deviated from a 50/50 division of marital assets awarded to Mrs. Cummings 66% of the
marital assets and Mr. Cummings received 34% of the marital assets.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The genesis of this case began in late 1992 when Mrs. Cummings filed for divorce from
her husband of thirty-eight years and attempted to take over the family business its property and

156363-1
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building.
The original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed by the trial court on
April 7, 1995. Issues concerning the division of assets were appealed by Mr. Cummings.
The Utah Court of Appeals in its decision rendered December 19,1996, remanded the case
for further findings as to the Court's valuation of certain assets. The trial court elected to have a
trial as to those values and upon completion of trial entered its Amended Findings of Fact
distributing the marital assets substantially different than was done in the original decree the
substantial change in distribution was based upon the evidence addi iced at trial. In it's i Amended
Finding of Fact the Court specifically expressed its intent to divide the marital assets equally
betweei I the parties. The Coiii t n lade no findings as to why any divergence from an equal division
of marital assets was equitable and proceeded to divide the marital assets 66% to Mrs. Cummings
and 34% to Mr. Cummings.
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW

The trial court entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended
Decree of Divorce, which materially and substantially altered and changed the distribution of
marital assets.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

General Background
1. Mrs. ("utiiiiitngs filol for separate iiiauilcnaiicc oi in I he alternative for divorce on
September 1, 1992. (tr. 1 p.l)
2. Mi and Mrs. Cummings were married on July 1,1954 and had seven children, all of
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whom were emancipated adults at the time Mrs. Cummings filed for divorce. Complaint f 2 & 4.
3. During the course of their marriage, the parties experienced irreconcilable differences
which made the continuation of the marriage impossible. Complaint f 16.
4. Mrs. Cummings' Complaint lists a general statement of her ex-husband's property,
along with an estimate of its value. Complaint 120.
5. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered April 7,1995, (tr. 4 p. 1295)
which specifically provides as a Finding of Fact that the Court's intent was to divide the marital
assets equally between the parties. The Court's language was to achieve a 50/50 division of
marital assets. "37) With an eye to dividing the marital assets of ;the parties in a way which would
allow the business to continue in operation and which is most nearly and equitable and 50/50
division . . . " (tr. 4 p. 1308).
6. The Court awarded the business to defendant (tr. 4 p. 1309) and the business land and
building to plaintiff (tr. 4 p. 1308 and 1309)
7. The decision of this Court on appeal was to remand this case for further findings
concerning the valuation of the closely held business and any amendments to the distribution of
marital assets that such reevaluation would require, (tr. 6 p. 2152-2153)
8. The trial court elected to hold a trial on remand as to that evaluation of the business and
the division of marital assets, (tr. 6. p. 2165) Upon completion of trial the Court entered its
Amended Findings of Fact on May 27,1998, significantly and substantially changing the division
of marital assets between the parties, (tr. 7 p. 2608)
9. The trial court in its Amended Findings of Fact reiterated its express intent to divide the
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marital assets equally between the parties on a 50/50 basis, (tr. 7 p. 2623)
10. Without any findings, facts, reasoning or explanation the Court refused to divide the
marital assets equally between the parties. The trial court awarded J\lis Cummings 66% of the
marital assets and awarded Mr. Cummings 34% of the marital assets. (See Exhibit "A"
Addendum)
11. The inequitable distribution of marital assets is clearly shown on Addendi im "A"
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Addendum "A" references each paragraph
of the Amended Findings of fact and the unequal division of mental ussels winch occurred,
SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT

I his appeal is l.iktm to seek a determination that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to meet it's own stated purpose of dividing the marital assets equally between the parties
and failing to provide any findings, facts, reasoning or explanation as to why an equal division of
marital assets was not achieved. The case should be remanded for this court u > make MR II findings
as to the reasons for not achieving an equal division of marital assets or to divide the marital assets
in the equal division as intended by the coiit1
ARGUMENT
I.

T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DIVIDE THE
MARITAL ASSETS EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED
IN FINDINGS OF FACT

A

Issue

Whether it is reversible error when the trial court specifically stated that it would divide the
marital estate 50/50 between the parties, but in fact divided the marital estate 66% to 34% without
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1

providing any findings, facts, reasoning or justification therefore.
B. Analysis
i.

<

Standard Of Review

In divorce proceedings, the trial court is traditionally given considerable discretion in
fashioning an equitable property distribution. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,1074 (Utah 1985);
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Absent an abuse of discretion,
the court's findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear
weight of evidence, or unless the court determines that a mistake has been made. Weston v.
Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Rothe v. Rothe, 787 P.2d 534, 535-36 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In review of numerous divorce
appeals a 66% to 34% distribution is not uncommon nor so outlandish to merit automatic review
by an appeals court.
To permit appellate review of the property distribution, the distribution must be based upon
adequate factual findings and must be in accordance with the trial courts expressed intent and
within the standards set by the state's appellate courts. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,424
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The property
division must be in accord with the courts expressed intent. Several court decisions have required
that the failure to make findings on all material issues, constitutes reversible error "unless the facts
in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment.'" Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 1?>1 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) {quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)

1SMM-1
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In addition, the findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts
to reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue presented. Carlton v.
Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1988); Acton, 131 P.2d at 999; Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). There is a significant lack of factual findings in the present case as to the
disparity of the distribution of marital assets. The failure of the trial court to provide any Findings,
reasoning, facts, explanation, or justification for the property division contrary to the court's own
expressed intent is reversible error.
ii.

Findings

Recent case law is clear that if the trial court failed to enter specific, detailed findings
supporting itsfinancialdeterminations, then the court abused its discretion. In cases tried in equity
to the bench, the court is required to 'find the facts specially* and thus ground its decision on
findings of fact which resolve the material factual uncertainties and are expressed in enough detail
to enable a reviewing court to determine whether they are clearly erroneous." Erwin v. Erwin, 113
P.2d 847, 848-49 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). "To ensure the court acted
within its broad discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth fully in
appropriate findings and conclusions." Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)
(citations omitted); accord Linam v. King, 804 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah App. 1991). These findings
must be adequate to ensure on appeal "'that the trial court's discretionary determination was
rationally based.'" Painter, 752 P.2d at 909 (quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 994
(Utah 1986)). Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1992).
In the present case this court stated,

156363-1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

With an eye to dividing the marital assets of the parties in a way which would allow
the business to continue in operation and which is most nearly an equitable and
50/50 division, the court finds a division of the marital assets should be as follows:
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p 6 , tr. 7 p. 2623)
Then the court proceeded to divide the marital assets 66% to Mrs. Cummings and 34% to
Mr. Cummings. (See Addendum "A" attached hereto). The Amended Findings of Fact are
completely void of any explanation as to why the trial court refused divide the marital estate 50/50
as was expressly its intent. Defendant meets his burden as required in Moon v. Moon, 361 Utah
Adv. Rep. 15 (Jan. 22, 1999), see Exhibit A.
Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."
Alfred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108,1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d
952, 958 (Utah App. 1988)). See also Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App. 1992).
Detailed findings are necessary to determine whether the trial court has exercised its discretion in a
rational manner. When the Court fails to justify by detailed findings its deviation from its stated
intent this Court must reverse and remand the case for entry of sufficient findings to support the
Court's deviation from that expressed intention. Rehn v. Rehn, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App.
Feb. 19,1999).
Under Utah law, there is a presumption that the marital property will be divided equally.
Therefore, when the court decided to divide the property 66% to 34% between the parties, as it did
in this case, the trial court must be required to make findings of facts and provide some reasoning
and justification for its ruling determining that its stated intent of a 50/50 division of assets as the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court specifically intended was not equitable or was not be realized in its distribution of marital
assets.
For example, in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), the court observed that trial
courts must distribute property between the parties to a divorce in a fair, systematic fashion. See
Id. at 1172 & n. 10. The trial court is required to categorize the parties' property as part of the
marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other. The presumptive rule is that each
party is entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property. See
M a t 1172.
Later, in Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App., 1993), the appeals court held the absence
of findings that would justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal distribution is grounds
for reversal:
[T]he court's division of the estate cannot stand undisturbed when we are not
presented with sufficient findings to demonstrate that the court's ruling comports
with established law. The trial court made no findings as to any exceptional
circumstances which took this case out of the presumptive rule of Burt... an
unequal distribution of the parties' marital property makes no sense in the absence
of findings justifying the decision, especially since appellee did not seek this result.
. .Absent findings that would justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal
distribution, we reverse and remand.
Id., 858 P.2d 1018 (Ct. App. 1993).
The only exception to this rule is where the facts in the record are so clear and
uncontroverted that the trial court did not need to make any special findings. "Failure of the trial
court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are
'clear, uncontro verted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment."'
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209
156363-1
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(Ut Ct. App. 1991).
iii. Division of Property
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that there "is nofixedformula which a trial judge
must follow in making a division of properties." Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975). It is the
prerogative of the court to make whatever disposition of property it deems fair, equitable and
necessary for the protection and welfare of the parties, See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235
(Utah 1977). However, the overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable—that
property be fairly divided between the parties given their contributions during the marriage and
their circumstances at the time of the divorce. See Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278
(Utah 1987). In the present case the trial court specifically stated its intent to divide the marital
assets 50/50.
The trial court is not without guidance in reaching an equitable division of marital property.
The Utah courts have defined the factors for the trial court to consider in fashioning an equitable
property division. The amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the property was
acquired before or during the marriage; the source of the property; the health of the parties; the
parties' standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the
duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties' ages at time of marriage and of
divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship the property
division has with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. Burke v. Burke, 733
P.2d 133,135 (Utah 1987) (footnote omitted). The Courts are required to "follow the systematic
approach set forth in BurC Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). That is, the court

i^iAi-i
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should first "properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate
property of one or the other. Each party is then presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate
property and fifty percent of the marital property." Id., 802 P.2d at 136. If the court then divided
the marital estate in a division less then an equal division the court must justify such action by
making findings of fact, which provide rational for the action taken.
iv. Conclusion
The trial court in this case failed to make any findings as to why a 50/50 division of marital
assets would not be provided as the court failed to explain in any finding why a 66% to 34%
division of marital assets was warranted or equitable.
A trial court cannot make an uneven property distribution, which departs from its own
expressed intent and the presumptive rule that marital assets are to be divided equally, without
providing detailed findings and facts to disclose the steps that the court took to arrive at the
ultimate decision of an unequal division of marital property. Otherwise, it is impossible for an
appellate court to determine whether trial court has exercised its discretion in a rational manner.
The remedy sought on appeal is to vacate the Amended Decree of Divorce and remand the
case to the trial court with instructions to either divide the marital estate equally as stated was the
express intent of the trial court or to provided a substantive set of findings and facts which would
justify an unequal division of those marital assets.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FAILED TO
PROVIDE ANY REASONING OR JUSTIFICATION FOR FAILING TO DIVIDE THE
MARITAL ASSETS EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES

This Court has noted that in divorce proceedings the trial court has considerable discretion
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in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380
(Utah App. 1987). However, an appellate court only grants deference to the trial court "when [its]
findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's decision."
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477 (Utah App. 1991); accord State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d
767, 771 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court decision afforded no deference when findings are
inadequate). Therefore, for an appellate court "to determine whether the evidence adduced at trial
supports the trial court's findings, the findings must embody sufficient detail and include enough
subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which they are ground. Woodward, 823 P.2d at
477 (citing Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).
Defendant recognizes that he has the burden of marshaling the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings and then demonstrating to this Court that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the
findings.1 Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477; accord Hardy v. Hardy, 116 P.2d 917, 923 (Utah App.
1989). However, if the trial court's findings are insufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary
basis or factual basis for the court's decision, an appellate court will not grant the usual deference
to the trial court's findings. Id.
In the present case, there was a brief post-default evidentiary hearing. The court's findings
must still be adequately supported and must "clearly show the evidence upon which the Findings
are grounded." Id. Accordingly, unless the evidentiary hearing contains sufficient evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, they are inadequate and this Court need not grant any
1

To help meet this burden, Defendant has set out in Addendum "A" each of the court's findings and conclusions as to
the division of marital assets and has cited to the evidence in the record, if any, supporting each specific finding. As
even a cursory review of Addendum "A" reveals, many of the findings are unsupported by any evidence and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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deference to the trial court's ruling.
Accordingly, the case should be remanded for the taking of further evidence, to be
presented by both sides, regarding the valuation of the marital estate and sufficient findings as to
why the expressed intent of the court to divide the marital assets equally was not followed.
III.

CONCLUSION

The trial court erred in failing to provide any findings, facts, reasoning or justification for
its departure from its stated purpose of dividing the marital assets 50/50 between the parties. The
Amended Decree of Divorce should be vacated and the case remanded for the trial court to enter
such findings which justify the division of assets set forth in its Amended Findings of Fact or
should take such evidence in trial to determine a 50/50 equal division of the marital assets as stated
in its express intent.
DATED this J2& — day of March, 1999.

M. Byron Fisher
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Appellant

remaining findings are inadequately supported. Even based upon unsupported evidence the division of marital assets
does not divide the marital estate 50/50 between the parties.
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ADDENDUM "A"
ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS
Amended
Findings of
Fact Paragraph
Asset

-

21

Home

24

Paintings

25

Stocks

26
27 & 36(e)

Value

Wife

Husband

127,000

127,000

8,194

8,194

227,918

113,959

(additional taken from stocks
temporary Order)

10,000

10,000

1993 Oldsmobile

25,000

25,000

Personal Property

113,959

25,000

5,000

36(b)

75%/25%ofland

105,000

78,750

26,250

36(c)

75%/25% of building

692,748

519,561

173,187

36(a)

Business

481,816

37

481,816
(260,000)z

Loan against the property
If tlle land and the Building are divided equally:
Overpaid Rent, rate of Decree through Oct., 1997
Total of assets to each party

The balance due at the date of original Decree of Divorce was $260,000.

1
46.500

(46.500)

953.964

493.712
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DAVID A. McPHIE (2216)
Attorney for Plaintiff
2105 East Murray-HoIIaday Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
(801) 278-3700

Otip-j

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo-

OLETTA CUMMINGS,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
UPON REMAND

Plaintiff,
vs.
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 92 490 3713 DA
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Commissioner Michael S. Evans
—ooOoo—

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki in his
Courtroom located at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 6th day of March, 1995, at
the hour of 8:30 o'clock a.m. The Plaintiff appeared in person and through her attorney of record,
David A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and through his attorney of record, Earl
Spafford.
The court noted that the Default of the Defendant had been previously entered, and his
answer stricken as part of the court's previous order signed on the 17th day of February, 1995.
The Plaintiff testified concerning jurisdiction and grounds, and in support of the other
allegations of her complaint, and in some detail, concerning substantive matters.
This was done in an effort by the court, to provide the Defendant with a fair and equitable
1
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outcome in these divorce proceedings, even though he had only a limited right to participate in them,
having previously had his answer stricken and his default entered.
The court considered the testimony of the Plaintiff, and the testimony of the accountant
Stephen F. Petersen. A Motion to publish all volumes of the depositions of C. Kay Cummings was
granted. The Court considered the testimony of the Defendant as contained therein, and documents
submitted to the court in connection with those proceedings, and as attached to the deposition. The
Court having considered the file, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court published its original
[Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and signed the original Decree of Divorce on the 7th day
| of April, 1995.
I

The Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The Court

of Appeals remanded the matter back to the District Court for further proceedings on specific issues,
on December 19,1996.1
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki upon remand
from the Court of Appeals on the 11th day of August, 1997, and again on the 22nd day of
September, 1997. At the hearing on remand, the parties were present, and were represented by their
legal counsel of record, David A. McPhie attorney for the Plaintiff, and M. Byron Fisher attorney
for the Defendant.
The court received testimony and reports and exhibits from the court appointed expert
witness David T. Posey. Plaintiff and Defendant examined the witness David Posey through
counsel, and subsequently the Court published its Amended Findings concerning the fair market

A copy of the Court's Order on Remand is attached to these Findings as Exhibit A.
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value of the business known as C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc.
This matter came on for further hearing on the 19th day of November, 1997, at the hour of
1:30 o'clock p.m., where the court heard proffers of fact, and argument from counsel concerning the
effect the Court's new Findings concerning the value of the business C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc.
should have on the overall distribution of property, and to consider the objections each party had
filed to the other's proposed new Amended Findings.
The Court having considered the arguments of counsel, and the proffers made, overruled the
objections of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
ofLaw.
The Court noted at the hearing on November 19, 1997, that it had previously, at the time of
the original Decree, left open for further consideration the question, as to what the fair monthly
rental or lease value of the building and real estate located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, was.
]

The question of the fair monthly lease or rental value of the subject building came on for

evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki on the 13th day of April, 1998,
at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m. The Plaintiff appeared in person and through her attorney of record
David A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and through his attorney of record M. Byron
Fisher.
The Court, after having heard the testimony, the arguments of counsel, and having received
the stipulation of the parties, and good cause therefore, made its Finding concerning the fair market

3
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lease value of said building and real estate located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.2
|

Having now conducted all hearings necessary to, and in connection with the issues on

remand, and those issues which were previously reserved for further hearing, the Court now,
publishes the following:

I

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON REMAND

(1)

The parties are husband and wife having been married on the 1 st day of July, 1954,

in Salt Lake City, State of Utah.
(2)

The parties have been married continuously ever since, or for a period of forty (40)

(3)

The parties were both residents of Salt Lake County for the three month period

years.

immediately prior to the filing of this Divorce Complaint.
(4)

During the course of this marriage the parties had children born to them children. All

of their children are now emancipated adults. Therefore the court need not makefindingsconcerning
custody, child support, visitation, or an Order to Withhold and Deliver.
(5)

The parties began a candy company which was known as C. Kay Cummings Candy

in approximately 1965. The parties have operated that candy company since that date, and it has
grown substantially in terms of physical size, and volume of business since then.
(6)

The Plaintiff, Oletta Cummings, played a major role over the years in the building

A copy of the separate Findings and Orderfromthat hearing is attached as Exhibit B.
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i of the candy company by both working there a great deal of the time and by taking care of the
children at home and in taking care of the home.
(7)

The court finds that in 1984, the parties incorporated the candy company (which had

previously been their partnership) and the company became known as C. Kay Cummings Candy,
Incorporated. The court however, also finds that the parties have essentially run the corporation as
though it were a partnership ever since its incorporation. The candy company has always been a
closely held family business with family members and principally the parties holding all of the stock,
and all of the executive positions in the corporation. The court further finds that the Defendant has
had, and continues to have, total control of the business, regardless of its corporate form.
(8)

The court further finds that the parties have ignored corporate formalities to a large

extent through the years. As one example, they have had few regular meetings of the board of
directors. Only a few sets of minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors exist. Two of the sets
of minutes were created by the Defendant subsequent to the commencement of this divorce action.
;

(9)

The court finds that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. is the alter ego of C. Kay

Cummings personally. The court also finds however, that there is no advantage to either party, and
it has not been requested by either party, that this court make an order concerning the legality,
viability, or integrity of that corporation. The court does however, find that the it must make some
decisions concerning the parties respective rights in the corporations assets, and that to protect the
marital assets, the court must make some determinations as to the parties' respective offices and
positions of control with regard to the corporation. Failure to do so on the court's part at this time
would lead to allowing one party or the other, to eviscerate the court's proposed decree in this matter,
and allow one party or the other to gain an unfair advantage or control over the other in post decree
5
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disagreements, which the court finds are likely to arise.
(10)

The court finds that Oletta Cummings served as a corporate officer in the corporation,

and was only recently, and after the commencement of these divorce proceedings, removed as a
corporate officer by the Defendant. The court further finds that the removal of Oletta Cummings as
an officer and member of the board of said corporation was not with proper notice and violated other
corporate law formalities. The court further finds that all appointments of others as officers and
directors of C. Kay Cummings Candy to have been without proper notice to the Plaintiff and in
violation of corporate law.
(11)

The court makes these findings for purposes of allowing the Plaintiff to protect her

interests in the corporate assets which the court intends to give her as part of the Decree in this
matter. The court further finds that should these steps be inadequate to give both parties equal power
and authority over corporate assets further post Decree of Divorce steps may need to be taken. The
court further finds that the parties are each one-half owners of all the stock of C. Kay Cummings
Candy, Inc.
(12)

The court finds that the business, which originally was commenced by the parties in

Sugar House, grew and that in approximately 1984, the parties purchased land located at 2057 East
3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. The court further finds that the parties later, through an industrial
revenue bond, obtained a loan and built a building on the land located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and that they subsequently moved the C. Kay Cummings Candy business into that
building.
(13)

The court finds that the building, the land, and all the equipment, and assets, have

been appraised by a court ordered appraiser, one David Posey, who is an accountant, who has relied
6
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on sub-appraisers as to the value of the real estate. The building has been appraised as being worth
$587,748.00 and the land as being worth $105,000.00. The court further finds that these values are
in some question but that neither party has objected thereto. On the other hand, the court finds that
neither party agrees that $397,000.00 is the earning capacity of the business. This matter of the
value of the business itself has been appealed by the Defendant and the question has been remanded
to this court for further consideration. The court has elected to take evidence on the issue, and an
evidentiary hearing was held on August 11,1997, and again on September 22, 1997.
A.

At said hearing, the Court received the testimony of the witness David Posey,

a Certified Public Accountant, who was previously appointed by the Court to do an
appraisal of the subject business. Mr. Posey was called and sworn. Mr. Posey was
examined and cross examined by counsel at some length. Mr. Posey identified
Defendant's exhibits 1,2, and 3, and the same were admitted in evidence.
B.

The court finds that David Posey is an independent Certified Public

Accountant, and is not an employee of the Defendant, nor does the witness share any
interest in the outcome of these proceedings.
C.

The Court finds that the evaluation of the business by the Court appointed

expert included consideration of the value of any good will of the business. The
Court also finds that the valuation given by David Posey is based on unaudited
factual data reported to him by Mr. Cummings. The court further finds that the
appraisal done by Mr. Posey was based on generally accepted business accounting
practices used in evaluating businesses.
D.

The court finds that the value of the business without the building or the real
7
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estate at the time of the divorce, was $481,816.00. The court further finds that this
amount takes into account previously taxed but undistributed income, and that
paragraph #21 of its previous Findings should be deleted.
(14)

The courtfindsthat the real estate on which the candy company building is built and

where the business is transacted is in the name of the parties as joint tenants and always has been.
The court furtherfindsthat the parties have leased that land to the business over the years, and that
at one time they had a written lease agreement. Said land lease agreement provided that each of the
parties would be paid $500.00 per month. The court further finds that in recent years, the parties
have orally agreed to a land lease paymentfromthe business to them personally at $1,500.00 each
per month ($3,000.00 per month total). The court makes nofindingas to what the fair lease value
of the land and/or building to the business is, butfindsthat by the course of conduct, $1,500.00 each
per month from C. Kay Cummings, Inc. to the Plaintiff and Defendant has become the agreement
of the parties.
(15)

The court finds that during the course of the litigation in this case which extended

originally over a period of approximately two and one-half years, (and by the time the Court heard
the matter on remand nearly five years), the Defendant has totally controlled the business, C. Kay
Cummings Candy, Inc. The court further finds that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. is currently
behind in its land lease obligation to Oletta Cummings for the months of September 1992 through
December 1992, January 1993 through December 1993, January 1994 through May 1994, and
December 1994 through September 1995, for a total arrearage spanning twenty-four (24) months and
a total arrearage in the amount of $36,000.00.
(16)

The court further finds that the Defendant was ordered to pay Oletta Cummings
8
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$ 1,663.00 per month as and for temporary alimony early in these proceedings. This has been the
order of the court for a period of approximately two and one-half years. The court further finds that
the Defendant has tried during the divorce proceedings to get credit against his monthly temporary
alimony obligation by sending checks to the Plaintiff marked land lease payment, and not sending
a separate alimony check to her in the $ 1,663.00 per month amount. The court further finds that the
Plaintiff has obtained on two separate occasions judgments against the Defendant including
attorney's fees arrearages in the alimony obligation and that the court on two prior occasions found
that the temporary alimony obligation, and the land lease obligation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff
are separate obligations, and that the Defendant is not entitled to credit for one against the other.
(17)

The court finds that the parties discussed the idea of a Family Trust in 1984 when

candy business was incorporated. The court further finds that the notion of a family trust was
referred to in some of the documents surrounding the financing of the building and that the parties
signed a stock certificate at the time the business was incorporated which purported to transfer the
stock of the corporation to a family trust. The court finds however, that no trust existed at the time
of that transfer and that therefore the purported stock transfer was null and of no effect. The court
further finds that at the time the stock transfer document was executed by the parties, it was
anticipated that a subsequent family trust which was yet to be formed, would contain provisions
jointly agreed on by the parties. The Court finds that there was no subsequent agreement or
formation of a joint trust. The court further finds that the Defendant, by himself, subsequent to the
incorporation and the document purporting the transfer of each of the parties corporate stock to a
trust, created his own trust. The court finds that the Defendant could not or did not obtain the
signature of his wife on that trust agreement. The court further finds that the Defendant then
9
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attempted to create a trust by himself by being the sole trustor and trustee. The court also finds that
I although the Defendant had the power to create and fund a trust by himself, he did not by himself
have the power to put his wife's share of marital assets into his own personal trust.
(18)

The court further finds that it must make findings with regard to the validity of the

| purported Cummings Family Trust referred to immediately above in that the Defendant has, since
j a relatively early time in these proceedings, maintained that a family trust exists, and that much of
the marital property of the parties is in that trust, and that it is therefore outside the reach of the court.
The court further finds that in the fall of 1993, while this divorce was pending, and after nine years
of ignoring the claimed trust, the Defendant unilaterally and without notice to anyone, after nine
years of being the sole "trustee" of the "trust," attempted appoint two co-trustees, had trust letterhead
printed, and opened a trust account. All of these activities were the first interest shown by the
Defendant in the trust that the Defendant in nine years time, and only after the divorce action was
commenced. The court furtherfindsthat in the fall of 1993, when this divorce had been pending for
approximately one year, the Defendant then had his purported newly appointed co-trustees file an
action through separate counsel to try and intervene in this divorce action to protect the assets of the
so called trust. The court notes that this matter of intervention was heard first by the court's
commissioner for domestic matters, Michael S. Evans, and that pursuant to the rules concerning
intervention, the Commissioner made a recommendation that the trustees not be allowed to
intervene. That recommendation was appealed to this court and subsequently sustained. In so doing
the court then found and now finds that the Defendant, as the original trustee, and a continuing
"trustee" under the Defendant's alleged trust, could adequately represent the interest of the trust in
the divorce litigation, reserving to the Defendant the right to call his alleged co-trustees, or other
10
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witnesses at the time of trial. The court furtherfindsthat the Defendant had no bank account of any
kind for the trust for approximately nine yearsfrom1984 to 1993. That there was no trust letterhead,
and that no trust business was conducted. That the trust filed no tax returns until 1993 when the
Defendant began to realize the weakness of his trust claim, at which time he opened trust account,
had letterhead printed, and began tofiletrust returns.
(19) The court further finds that the Defendant, established or attempted to establish another
trust like entity in the late 1980fs or early 1990's, giving a new trustee, namely one Frank Pond
I Reese, control over aspects and assets of the candy company, which the Defendant has claimed were
transferred earlier into the 1984 trust. That the court finds this behavior is inconsistent with the
notion that the 1984 trust ever existed, even in the mind of the Defendant. The court finds that no
other non-business related, non-marital assets, were ever put into the "trust." The courtfindsthat
the Cummings Family Trust does not now exist, specifically that the trust that the Defendant
purported to try and establish by himself in 1984 never existed, and that none of the assets of the
candy company or the parties are now, or ever were, transferredfromthe control of the shareholders,
or owners of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. The court further finds that each of the parties hereto
each own one-half of the C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. stock and that they each own personally
one-half of the land, building, and business located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
which serves as the premises of the Candy Company.
(20)

The court further finds that each of the parties personally own one-half of all other

assets of the C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. including investment accounts, bank accounts, motor
vehicles, equipment, stock, materials, accounts receivable and contracts, and any other property of
any description wheresoever situated located at the 33rd South location or at the foothill store.
11
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(21)

The courtfindsthat the parties acquired a home and real estate during the marriage

located at 1134 E. Herbert Ave, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is currently paid for. The court further
finds that said home and real estate is worth approximately $127,000.00. Further, the courtfindsthat
said home was purchased by the parties from the Plaintiffs parents on favorable terms due to the
relationship existing between the Plaintiff, Defendant, and the Plaintiffs parents.
(22)

The court further finds that the parties have been separated for more than two years,

and that the Plaintiff has resided in the home since the date of the parties separation. The court finds
[that the parties have largely divided between them the personal property that was located in the
house in a manner which should be confirmed by the court, awarding to each of the parties those
items of personal property currently in their possession as their sole and separate property, free and
clear of any claim of the other party subject only to exceptions which are otherwise specified herein.
(23)

The courtfindsthat the coin collection (silver coins) and the stamp collection, have

values of $422.00 and $1,129.80, respectively and that these should be awarded to the Defendant
who collected them.
(24)

The court finds that the art work (paintings) of the parties have a value of $8,194.00

and should be awarded to Plaintiff.
(25)

The courtfindsthat the parties should each be awarded one-half of all stocks, bonds,

and other investments acquired during the course of the marriage by the parties or either of them
currently held or administered by Smith Barney, or First Western Financial Advisors, or elsewhere
regardless of the name the account may be in. These accounts currently have total market value of
$237,918.00 and each of the parties should be awarded $118,959.00 worth. The courtfindsthat the
known investments may be described as and have the values as listed on Exhibit C attached hereto.
12
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(26)

The court furtherfindsthat the Plaintiff should be awarded the 1993 Oldsmobile as

her sole and separate property free and clear of any claim of the Defendant.
(27)

The court further finds that each of the parties should be awarded approximately one-

half of all other personal property acquired during the course of the marriage not otherwise herein
provided for.
(28)

The court finds that determining the Defendant's income is problematic. The

business, C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., has had gross sales in 1992 and 1993 of $1,125,388.00 and
$1,281,404.00 respectively. Although the Cummings personal tax returns show joint income of
$151,064.00 and $205,760.00 for 1992 and 1993, the Defendant has chosen for the parties to live
austerely, and has during the last two years of the divorce, while this divorce has been pending
chosen to live in a small office at the candy store and to shower at a local gymnasium. In doing this,
the Defendant has chosen for the parties, instead of taking income, to plow both parties share of the
income back into the business as previously taxed and retained income as referred to in paragraph
twenty-one above.
I

(29)

The court finds that the Defendant's stated income at the time of deposition was

unusually low. The court finds that this stated salary is artificially low, and is not reasonably or
realistically connected to the amount of money that the Defendant could or would but for these
divorce proceedings, be taking out of the business income. The court further finds that determining
income for support purposes may be different than for IRS purposes {Utah Code Anno. §7-45-7.5).
The court further finds that a reasonable amount to attribute to the Defendant as income, including
a salaryfromthe business without putting the cash flow and needs of the business at risk is $ 160,000
per year or $13,330.00 per month gross. The court makes thisfindingbased on the testimony of
13
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i Stephen F. Petersen who reviewed the tax returns of the business for 1992 and 1993, and the parties
I for 1992 and 1993.
(30)

The court further finds that this finding in paragraph thirty immediately above is

| unnecessarily difficult to make because the Defendant has refused to participate in the discovery
process in ways and to an extent which is documented elsewhere in the file and which ultimately led
I to his answer being stricken and his default entered.
(31)

The court further finds that the Defendant has provided little information over the two

and one-half year span of this case concerning his expenses. What little information the court does
have was provided early in the divorce process during a time when the Defendant was living at the
candy store, apparently the Defendant has continued to live at the candy store during these divorce
proceedings, obtaining his meals commercially, and showering at a local gymnasium. The court
finds that the Defendant cannot reasonably continue to live at the candy store, buy all his meals
commercially, and shower at a gymnasium, and that he will ultimately choose, post decree of
divorce, to live under less than such austere circumstances, and with no other information available
from him but his original declaration of expenses on file, that his monthly expenses are, or will
reasonably be, $1,500.00 per month.
(32)

The court finds that the Plaintiff is employable but all her experience is at the candy

company where she has developed experience in all phases of the candy business over a period of
thirty plus years, the court finds that the Plaintiff at age sixty-four is not likely to be retrained in
another field orfinda job that will pay her more than near minimum wage.
(33)

The courtfindsthat the Plaintiff is entitled to both A^

payment for her one-half share of the real estate on which the business is located, and alimony in the
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

amount of $ 1,663.00 per month which has been the temporary order of the court for two and one-half
years. In making this finding the court notes that both parties need for support has contracted to
meet the money available based on the Defendant's unilateral decision to put the parties in an
austerity mode during these divorce proceedings. That the Defendant has been under court order to
pay $1,663.00 per month in alimony and under a contractual obligation to pay $1,500.00 per month
additionally in land lease payments. The court further specifically finds that the $3,000.00 a month
that the business has been paying for the land, ($1,500.00 to each party) is not the fair monthly lease
or rental value of the land and building, and that the fair monthly lease value of the land and building
as of April 13,1998, was the amount of $7,414.00 per month triple net, meaning with the lessee or
tenant paying this amount plus all taxes and insurance on the building, etc.
(34)

The court further finds that the Plaintiff is unemployed She has historically had

expenses of $1,663.00 per month during these proceedings. The court finds that it is difficult to set
an appropriate alimony amount in this case because of the Defendant's failure to participate in the
discovery process. The court notes that in making this alimony finding that the Defendant argued
on more than one occasion that his temporary alimony obligation should be lowered but in each
instance the temporary alimony of $1,663.00 was upheld. The Defendant, with some prodding, has
paid this amount for two and one-half years. The court finds that Mrs. Cummings is entitled to
receive, on a permanent basis, $ 1,663.00 per month as alimony and the income she will receive from j
'the ownership of the land and building, which the court intends to award her as her one-half of share
i

of the marital assets. The court further finds that C. Kay Cummings can, and has had in the past, the
1

\

power to pay said alimony and to make sure that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. pays Oletta I
Cummings a lease payment on the building and real estate, and that said lease payment should be
15
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in an amount equal to 75% of the fair market lease value. The court finds the fair market lease value
to be $7,414.00 per month. The Defendant should be ordered to pay or cause to be paid to the
Plaintiff 75% of said fair market value per month, or the amount of $5,560.00, commencing on the
1st day of May, 1998.
(35)

The court finds that the best thing for both parties would be to preserve the business,

C. Kay Cummings Candy, as an ongoing concern operated by the Defendant. A sale of the business
assets is not an attractive alternative because the income producing capacity and blue sky of the
business is closely tied to the Defendant operating the business himself, and because of the specialty
I nature of the business.
(36)

With an eye to dividing the marital assets of the parties in a way which would allow

the business to continue in operation and which is most nearly an equitable and 50/50 division, the
court finds a division of the marital assets should be awarded as follows:
TO THE PLAINTIFF:
a.

The home and real estate located at 1134 Herbert Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah,

in align with the value;
b.

Value: $127,000.00

A 75% interest in the ground located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City,

Utah, which is the real estate on which the business building is located and the business is operated;

Value: $78,750.00
c.

A 75% interest in the building located at 2057 East 3300 South on the above

described land on which the business is located;
Value:
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$440,811.00

d.

One half of the Smith Barney and First Western Advisors investment accounts

with values totaling $227,918.00, or $113,959.00 to her.
e.

All personal property currently located in the home and real estate at 1134

Herbert Avenue, including the jewelry in the Defendant's possession (the collateral), with the
I exception of the stamp collection and coin collection.
Estimated value at the time of hearing: $25,000.00
TOTAL TO PLAINTIFF

$785,520.00

TO THE DEFENDANT:
a.

All of the equipment, materials, stock, accounts receivable, and other personal

property of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., including Blue Sky, the van, and the ongoing right to
operate the business in the name of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. plus the previously taxed income
retained by the business.
|

Business Value: (without real estate) $481,816.00
b.

All the Defendant's clothing and personal effects and personal property

currently in his possession including the stamp and coin collections; but not the jewelry referred to
above;

Value: $ 5,000.00
c.

One half of Smith Barney and First Western Advisors stock and retirement

accounts;

Value: $113,959.00
d.

A 25% interest in the real estate and building located at 2057 East 3300 South,

Salt Lake City, Utah.
Value: $178,187.00
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TOTAL TO DEFENDANT:
(37)

$778,962.00

The court furtherfindsthat the business C. Kay Cummings Candy has in addition to

paying the $1,500.00 per month to each party as a land lease payment, been making the payment to
Helen Rappaport and Alan S. Cohen for the financing on the land and/or building (which had a
balance owing on March 17, 1998 or $321,684.00). The court finds that the Defendant should
assume and pay debt on the land and building as his sole and separate debt, and hold the Plaintiff
harmless thereon.
(38)

The courtfindseach of the parties should execute all documents needed to carry out

the intent of thesefindingsand decree based thereon
(39)

The courtfindsthat the plaintiff has asked the court for and received from the court

prior judgments for temporary attorney's fees, which have been paid by the Defendant. The court
further finds that in addition to the fees which have been previously awarded and paid, the Plaintiff
has reasonably incurred the sum of $2,920.00 in additional attorney's and paralegal fees, and $300.00
in additional costs of court for professional witnesses who testified at the time of the default hearing,
namely Stephen F. Petersen.
Having published the above findings of fact the court now makes the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

(1)

The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of

matrimony previously existing between the parties. The same to becomefinalupon the signing and
entry thereof.
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(2)

The Decree of Divorce should adopt and be congruent with the Findings of Fact

outlined above.
(3)

I

The trust the Defendant attempted to create in 1984 does not now exist, never existed,

and was never funded with marital assets or otherwise.
(4)

Oletta Cummings is the Vice President and a member of the Board of Directors of

C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., having never been removedfromthose offices.
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